Abstract. We propose an undeniable signature scheme based on elliptic curve isogenies, and prove its security under certain reasonable number-theoretic computational assumptions for which no efficient quantum algorithms are known. Our proposal represents only the second known quantum-resistant undeniable signature scheme, and the first such scheme secure under a number-theoretic complexity assumption.
Introduction
Many current cryptographic schemes are based on mathematical problems that are considered difficult with classical computers, but can easily be solved using quantum algorithms. To prepare for the emergence of quantum computers, we aim to design cryptographic primitives for common operations such as encryption and authentication which resist quantum attacks. One family of such primitives, proposed by De Feo, Jao, and Plût [13, 20] , uses isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves to construct cryptographic protocols for public-key encryption, key exchange, and entity authentication which are believed to be quantumresistant. To date, however, this protocol family lacks comprehensive techniques for achieving data authentication, although certain limited capabilities, such as isogeny-based strong designated verifier signatures, are available [30] .
In this article, we present a new construction of quantum-resistant undeniable signatures based on the difficulty of computing isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves. Few such constructions are known, and indeed the only other proposed quantum-resistant undeniable signature scheme in the literature is the code-based scheme of Aguilar-Melchor et al. [1] . Our scheme uses a completely different approach and is based on completely different assumptions, making it a useful alternative in the event that some breakthrough arises in the cryptanalysis of code-based systems.
Related work
Mainstream post-quantum cryptosystems can be categorized into several broad families: lattice-based systems [17, 25] and learning with errors [26] , code-based systems [2, 7, 24] , hash-based signatures [6, 11] , and systems based on multivariate polynomials [3, 34] . Isogeny-based cryptosystems represent an interesting alternative to the above because they are based on a (relatively) naturally occurring number-theoretic computational problem, namely, the problem of computing isogenies between elliptic curves. These systems thus constitute one of the only families of quantum-resistant cryptosystems based on a number-theoretic assumption (depending on whether one counts solutions to multivariate polynomials as a number-theoretic problem).
Generally speaking, lattice-based systems are more naturally suited to encryption, with lattice-based signature schemes being less mature than the corresponding encryption schemes, whereas hash functions and multivariate polynomials more readily yield signature schemes compared to encryption schemes. Isogeny-based cryptosystems to date have dealt primarily with encryption, with the exception of the entity authentication protocol of [13, §3.1] . We remark that, although entity authentication in the classical setting enables data authentication via the Fiat-Shamir transformation [14] , the Fiat-Shamir transformation fails against a quantum adversary [10] . This work, together with Sun et al.'s construction of strong designated verifier signatures [30] , provides some evidence that isogenies can also be used as the basis for signatures and data authentication in the post-quantum setting.
We emphasize again that quantum-safe undeniable signatures seem to be difficult to construct by any means. The only known prior quantum-resistant undeniable signature scheme is by Aguilar-Melchor et al. [1] , using linear codes.
Background
Due to space constraints, we cannot provide here a full treatment of the necessary background information. For further details on the mathematical foundations of isogenies, we refer the reader to [13, 20, 28] .
Given two elliptic curves E 1 and E 2 over some finite field F q of cardinality q, an isogeny φ is an algebraic morphism from E 1 to E 2 of the form
such that φ(∞) = ∞ (here f 1 , f 2 , g 1 , g 2 are polynomials in two variables, and ∞ denotes the identity element on an elliptic curve). Equivalently, an isogeny is an algebraic morphism which is a group homomorphism. The degree of φ, denoted deg(φ), is its degree as an algebraic morphism. Two elliptic curves are isogenous if there exists an isogeny between them. Given an isogeny φ : E 1 → E 2 of degree n, there exists another isogenŷ φ : E 2 → E 1 of degree n satisfying φ •φ =φ • φ = [n] (where [n] is the multiplication by n map). It follows that the relation of being isogenous is an equivalence relation. The isogenyφ is called the dual isogeny of φ. Section 6 (Remark 6.1) describes how to compute dual isogenies in our application.
For any natural number n, we define E[n] to be the subgroup
In other words, E[n] is the kernel of the multiplication by n map over the algebraic closureF q of F q . The group E[n] is isomorphic to (Z/nZ) 2 as a group whenever n and q are relatively prime [28] . We define the endomorphism ring End(E) to be the set of all isogenies from E to itself defined over the algebraic closureF q of F q . The endomorphism ring is a ring under the operations of pointwise addition and functional composition. If dim Z (End(E)) = 2, then we say that E is ordinary; otherwise dim Z (End(E)) = 4 and we say that E is supersingular. Two isogenous curves are either both ordinary or both supersingular. All elliptic curves used in this work are supersingular.
The isogeny φ : E 1 → E 2 is defined to be separable if the function field extension
) is separable. In this work, we will only consider separable isogenies. An important property of a separable isogeny is that the size of the kernel of that isogeny is equal to the degree of that isogeny (as an algebraic map) [28, III.4.10(c) ]. The kernel K of φ uniquely defines the isogeny φ up to isomorphism [28, III.4.12] ; for this reason, we use the notation E 1 /K to denote the codomain E 2 of the isogeny φ. Methods for computing and evaluating isogenies are given in [5, 13, 20, 21, 32] . All the isogenies that we use have the property that the kernels are cyclic groups, and knowledge of the kernel, or any single generator of the kernel, allows for efficient evaluation of the isogeny (up to isomorphism); conversely, the ability to evaluate the isogeny via a black box allows for efficient determination of the kernel (cf. Remark 3.1). Thus, in our application, the following are equivalent: knowledge of the isogeny, knowledge of the kernel, or knowledge of any generator of the kernel.
Quantum-resistant elliptic curve cryptography
The term "elliptic curve cryptography" typically encompasses cryptographic primitives and protocols whose security is based on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curves. Against quantum computers, this hardness assumption is invalid [27] . Hence, traditional elliptic curve cryptography is not a viable foundation for constructing quantum-resistant cryptosystems. As a result, alternative elliptic curve cryptosystems based on hardness assumptions other than discrete logarithms have been proposed for use in settings where quantum resistance is desired. One early proposal by Stolbunov [29] , based on isogenies between ordinary elliptic curves, was subsequently shown by Childs et al. [8] to offer only subexponential difficulty against quantum computers.
3
Following these developments, De Feo et al. [13, 20] proposed a new collection of quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic protocols for entity authentication, key exchange, and public-key cryptography, based on the difficulty of 3 An essentially identical scheme had also been proposed earlier by Couveignes in an unpublished manuscript [9] , although not with quantum resistance as a motivation.
Output: j(EBA), sID computing isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves. We review here the operation of the most fundamental protocol in the collection, the key exchange protocol, since it contains several critical ideas upon which our undeniable signature scheme is based. 
Parameter generation
to form a secret shared key.
The full protocol is given in Figure 1 . We denote by A and B the identifiers of Carol and Dave, and use sID to denote the unique session identifier. 
Undeniable signatures from isogenies
In this section, we present a new construction of an undeniable signature scheme from isogenies. An undeniable signature can be verified by any party, but verification requires interaction with the signer. To distinguish between invalid (forged) signatures and valid signatures that the verifier refuses to verify, an undeniable signature scheme also includes a mechanism for the signer to prove (interactively) that an invalid signature is forged. Our construction uses a three-prime variant of the original two-prime protocol given in Section 3.2. As a consequence, the resulting commutative diagrams for zero-knowledge proofs become 3-dimensional rather than 2-dimensional.
Definition
We were unable to find any prior publications containing a definition and security model for undeniable signatures incorporating quantum computation. For this reason, we make a first attempt at addressing this gap in this section. Our definition of an undeniable signature scheme is the same as that of Kurosawa and Furukawa [22] , except for those changes necessary for achieving security in the quantum setting. We caution that our proposed security model is preliminary and may not represent a perfect resolution for this issue.
An undeniable signature scheme [22] consists of a key generation algorithm, a signing algorithm, a validity check, a signature simulator, a confirmation protocol π con and a disavowal protocol π dis . The role of the confirmation protocol π con is for the signer to prove to the verifier that the signature is valid. The role of the disavowal protocol π dis is for a valid signer to be able to prove to the verifier that the signature that the verifier has received is not valid. Quantum (entangled) information may be transmitted between any two parties which are both capable of quantum computation, or within a single quantum computation, but not between two classical-only parties, or a classical-only party and a quantum-capable party.
In what follows, we make the simplifying assumption that all parties except possibly the adversary are limited to classical computation only; the adversary is permitted to perform quantum computation. This assumption is not part of our security definition; rather, it is merely a simplifying assumption to make our task of analyzing our scheme easier.
Unforgeability is defined using the following game between a challenger and an adversary A.
1. The challenger generates a key pair (vk, sk) randomly, and gives the verification key vk to A. 2. For i = 1, 2, . . . , q s for some q s , A queries the signing oracle adaptively with a message m i and receives a signature σ i . 3. Eventually, A outputs a forgery (m * , σ * ).
We allow the adversary A to submit pairs (m j , σ j ) to the confirmation/disavowal oracle adaptively in step 2, where the confirmation/disavowal oracle responds as follows:
-If (m j , σ j ) is a valid pair, then the oracle returns a bit µ = 1 and proceeds with the execution of the confirmation protocol π con with A. -Otherwise, the oracle returns a bit µ = 0 and proceeds with the execution of the disavowal protocol π dis with A.
We say that A succeeds in producing a strong forgery if (m * , σ * ) is valid and (m * , σ * ) is not among the pairs (m i , σ i ) generated during the signing queries. The signature scheme is strongly unforgeable if the probability that A succeeds in producing a strong forgery is negligible for any P P T adversary A in the above game.
Invisibility is defined using the following game between a challenger and an adversary A.
1. The challenger generates a key pair (vk, sk) randomly, and gives the verification key vk to A. 2. A is permitted to issue a series of signing queries m i to the signing oracle adaptively and receive a signature σ i . 3. At some point, A chooses a message m * and sends it to the challenger. 4. The challenger chooses a random bit b. If b = 1, then he computes the real signature for m * using sk and sets it to be σ * . Otherwise he computes a fake signature m * using vk and sets it to be σ * . He sends σ * to A. 5. A performs some signing queries again. 6. At the end of this game, A outputs a guess b .
We allow the adversary A to submit pairs (m j , σ j ) to the confirmation/disavowal oracle adaptively in step 2 and in step 5. However, A is not allowed to submit the challenge (m * , σ * ) to the confirmation/disavowal oracle in step 5. Also, A is not allowed to submit m * to the signing oracle. We say that the signature scheme is invisible if no P P T adversary A has non-negligible advantage in this game.
For an undeniable signature scheme to be secure, it must satisfy unforgeability and invisibility. In addition, the confirmation π con and disavowal π dis protocols must be complete, sound, and zero-knowledge.
Protocol
Let p be a prime of the form
2 , together with bases
The design of the protocol is such that, generally speaking, points in P A , Q A are used for key material, points in P M , Q M are used for message data, and points in P C , Q C correspond to commitment data.
To generate such primes p, fix a choice of
, and e C C , and test random values of f until a value is found for which
The prime number theorem in arithmetic progressions (specifically, the effective version of Lagarias and Odlyzko [23] ) guarantees that only O(log p) trials are needed in expectation before a suitable prime is found. For any prime p, Bröker's algorithm for constructing supersingular curves [4] can efficiently produce a supersingular curve E over F p 2 having any admissible cardinality, namely any cardinality of the form p 2 + 1 − t where t satisfies the Hasse-Weil bound t ≤ 2p and the supersingularity condition t ≡ 0 (mod p). If we take the admissible value t = ±2p in Bröker's algorithm, then we obtain a supersingular elliptic curve of cardinality
We remark that in the event E happens to be defined over F p , the cardinality of E over F p 2 is necessarily (p + 1)
2 . The signer generates two secret random integers
To sign a message M , we compute the hash h = H(M ). Let
Then the signer computes the isogenies along with the auxiliary points φ M,AM (φ M (P C )) and φ M,AM (φ M (Q C )). The signer then presents these two auxiliary points along with E AM as the signature.
(See Figure 2 .) The confirmation protocol proceeds as follows. We must confirm E AM without revealing the isogenies used to produce it. We do so by "blinding" E AM using φ C and disclosing the blinded isogenies (see Figure 3 ).
1. The signer secretly selects random integers m C , n C ∈ Z/ e C C Z, and computes the point K C = [m C ]P C + [n C ]Q C together with the curves and isogenies in Figure 3 .
2. The signer outputs E C , E AC , E M C , E AM C , and ker(φ C,M C ) as the commitment. 3. The verifier randomly selects b ∈ {0, 1}. 4. If b = 0, the signer outputs ker(φ C ). Using the signer's public key, the verifier computes ker(φ A,AC ). Using knowledge of ker(φ M ), the verifier computes φ M,M C . Using the auxiliary points given as part of the signature, the verifier can compute φ AM,AM C . The verifier checks that each isogeny maps between the corresponding two curves specified in the commitment. Using knowledge of ker(φ C ), the verifier also independently re-computes φ C,M C and checks that it matches the commitment. 5. If b = 1, the signer outputs ker(φ C,AC ). The verifier computes φ M C,AM C and φ AC,AM C , and checks that each of φ C,AC , φ M C,AM C , and φ AC,AM C maps between the corresponding two curves specified in the commitment.
We now describe the disavowal protocol. Suppose the signer is presented with a falsified signature (E F , F P , F Q ) for a message M , where E F is the falsified E AM , and {F P , F Q } are the falsified auxiliary points corresponding to φ M,AM (φ M (P C )) and φ M,AM (φ M (Q C )) respectively. We must disavow E F without disclosing E AM . To do this, we blind E AM as before to obtain E AM C , and disclose enough information to allow the verifier to compute E F C and check that E F C = E AM C .
1. The signer secretly selects random integers m C , n C ∈ Z/ e C C Z, and computes
along with all the curves and isogenies in Figure 4. 2. The signer outputs E C , E AC , E M C , E AM C , and ker(φ C,M C ) as the commitment. 3. The verifier randomly selects b ∈ {0, 1}. 4. If b = 0, the signer outputs ker(φ C ). The verifier computes φ C , φ M,M C , φ A,AC , and φ F :
, and checks that each isogeny maps between the corresponding two curves specified in the commitment. The verifier independently re-computes φ C,M C and checks that it matches the commitment. The verifier also checks that E F C = E AM C . 5. If b = 1, the signer outputs ker(φ C,AC ). The verifier computes φ AC,AM C and φ M C,AM C , and checks that these isogenies map to E AM C . Fig. 4 : Disavowal protocol.
Complexity assumptions
As before, let p be a prime of the form B ] respectively. In analogy with [13, 20] , we define the following computational problems, which we assume are quantum-infeasible: 
Problem 5.4 (Supersingular Decision Diffie-Hellman (SSDDH) problem).
Given a tuple sampled with probability 1/2 from one of the following two distributions:
, and φ B (Q A ) are as in the SSCDH problem and
where m A , n A (respectively m B , n B ) are chosen at random from Z/ e A A Z (respectively Z/ e B B Z) and not both divisible by A (respectively B ), determine from which distribution the tuple is sampled.
Problem 5.5 (Decisional Supersingular Product (DSSP) problem).
Given an isogeny φ : E → E 3 of degree e A A and a tuple sampled with probability 1/2 from one of the following two distributions:
-(E 1 , E 2 , φ ), where the product E 1 × E 2 is chosen at random among those e B B -isogenous to E × E 3 , and where φ : E 1 → E 2 is an isogeny of degree e A A , and -(E 1 , E 2 , φ ), where E 1 is chosen at random among the curves having the same cardinality as E, and φ : E 1 → E 2 is a random isogeny of degree e A A , determine from which distribution the tuple is sampled.
Our security proofs also make use of the following additional modified assumptions not stated in [13, 20] .
Problem 5.6 (Modified Supersingular Computational Diffie-Hellman (MSSCDH) problem).
With notation as in the SSDDH problem, given E A , E B , and ker(φ B ), determine E AB . Note that no auxiliary points for φ A are given.
An equivalent formulation of the MSSCDH problem is: Given E A , m B , and n B , determine E AB .
Problem 5.7 (Modified Supersingular Decision Diffie-Hellman (MSSDDH) problem).
With notation as in the SSDDH problem, given E A , E B , E C , and ker(φ B ), determine whether E C = E AB . Note that no auxiliary points for φ A are given.
Problem 5.8 (One-sided Modified Supersingular Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (OMSSCDH)).
For fixed E A and E B , given an oracle to solve MSSCDH for any E A , E B , ker(φ B ) where E B ∼ = E B , solve MSSCDH for E A , E B , and ker(φ B ).
Problem 5.9 (One-sided Modified Supersingular Decision Diffie-Hellman problem (OMSSDDH)). For fixed E A , E B , and E C , given an oracle to solve MSS-CDH for any E A , E B , ker(φ B ) where E B ∼ = E B , solve MSSDDH for E A , E B , E C , and ker(φ B ).
We conjecture that these problems are computationally infeasible, in the sense that for any polynomial-time solver algorithm, the advantage of the algorithm is a negligible function of the security parameter log p. The resulting security assumptions are referred to as the DSSI assumption, CSSI assumption, etc.
We also need a heuristic assumption concerning the distribution of blinded false signatures: Assumption 5.10 Fix a supersingular elliptic curve E, an
B -isogeny φ B , and a curve E F , not isomorphic to E AB . For any pair of points {F P , F Q } in E F , only a negligibly small fraction of integer pairs m C , n C satisfy
Hardness of the underlying assumptions
All of our unmodified complexity assumptions (those not containing "Modified" in the name) are identical to the corresponding assumptions from [13, 20] , except that our assumptions are formulated using primes of the form p = B · f ± 1. We have no reason to believe that this alteration would affect the validity of these assumptions. A close analogy to this situation is the comparison between three-prime RSA and two-prime RSA.
Our modified assumptions are needed in order to prove the security of our undeniable signature scheme. The MSSCDH and MSSDDH assumptions are complementary to the SSCDH and SSDDH assumptions, with the main difference being that the input consists of a kernel but not two pairs of auxiliary points (rather than the other way around). The standard algorithm for computing the commuting isogeny from E B to E AB requires knowing both the values of the kernel of φ B and the auxiliary points for φ A . Similarly, the standard algorithm for computing the commuting isogeny from E A to E AB requires knowing both the values of the kernel of φ A and the auxiliary points for φ B . In SSCDH (say), the two sets of auxiliary points are known, but the kernels are not known. In MSSCDH, we break the symmetry, giving the attacker the kernel (and hence also the auxiliary points) for φ B , but no secret information about φ A . This kind of asymmetry is unavoidably necessary for any sort of isogeny-based signature scheme, since one isogeny somewhere will invariably be message-based, and this isogeny can have no secrets. Nevertheless, it is clear that the standard algorithm is not able to solve the modified problems, and we are not aware of any alternative algorithm which would be able to solve the modified problems using only the information given. Indeed, despite extensive study of these problems, we have not managed to devise any plausible approach to these problems other than the claw-finding attack against CSSI originally proposed in [13, Section 5.1] . This attack does not utilize the auxiliary points, and hence works equally well against our modified assumptions, with a running time of 4 √ p (respectively 6 √ p) on a classical (respectively quantum) computer. Other potential strategies discussed in [13, Section 5.1], such as algebraic approaches based on ideal classes in the endomorphism rings, fail in this setting for the same reasons as in [13] . Based on these considerations, we feel that some confidence can be ascribed to the MSSCDH and MSSDDH assumptions. The OMSSCDH and OMSSDDH assumptions are somewhat more artificial, and more study will be needed to justify confidence in them. They arise naturally in the analysis of our undeniable signature scheme. Our heuristic assumption (Assumption 5.10) seems quite natural, and we have conducted numerous empirical experiments for random choices of triplets (E F , F P , F Q ) without finding any violations at cryptographic parameter sizes. For artificially small parameter sizes, our experiments found that for any fixed choice of (E, φ A , φ B , E F , F P , F Q ), equality occurs with probability around 1/N over all pairs of integers (m C , n C ), where N = 
Security proofs
To prove the security of our scheme, we must show that the confirmation and disavowal protocols are complete, sound and zero-knowledge, and that the overall scheme satisfies the unforgeability and invisibility properties. In this section we consider a classical adversary; the case of quantum adversaries will be considered in Section 7.
The basic principle behind the proofs is that, as was the case in the basic keyexchange protocol (Section 3.2), knowledge of (the kernels of) any two oppositeside isogenies lying in a given cube face reveals no information about the other edges in the cube, by the DSSI and DSSP assumptions. On the other hand, knowledge of any two adjacent isogenies in a given commutative square yields full information about all the isogenies in the square. It does not matter which direction the arrows point, since one can reverse the direction of any arrow using dual isogenies (Section 2).
Remark 6.1. To compute the dual isogeny of an isogeny φ : E → E A = E/ A whose kernel is generated by a point A, pick any point B ∈ E \ A , and compute φ(B). Then φ(B) generates a kernel subgroup whose corresponding isogeny
is isomorphic to the dual isogenyφ. In general, E A / φ(B) is isomorphic but not equal to E, so we also need to compute the appropriate isomorphism, but computing isomorphisms in general is known to be easy [16] . 
Confirmation protocol
We need to prove three things: completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge. We apply classical techniques from [12, 18] .
Proof (Proof of completeness). Completeness for this protocol is obvious. Using the algorithm presented in Section 4.2, the signer can always compute the diagram in Figure 3 and make the verifier accept.
Proof (Proof of soundness). Let Charles be a cheating prover that is able to convince the verifier to accept an invalid signature with non-negligible probability. In order for Charles to be able to provide correct answers to both possible challenges in the confirmation protocol, there must exist a commutative diagram as in Figure 5 with all the edges filled in with actual isogenies. However, the existence of even a single such diagram implies that the signature must actually have been valid, since any three edges of a cube face determine the fourth edge. It follows that isogenies exist between E, E A , E M , and E AM to fill in the left face of the cube, rendering the signature valid. Hence soundness holds even against an infinitely powerful malicious prover.
Proof (Proof of zero-knowledge).
To prove that this scheme is zero knowledge we construct a simulator. Our simulator S makes uniformly random guesses about what the verifier's challenge will be. Regardless of the guess, S chooses random integers m C , n C ∈ Z/ e C C Z and computes
If S guesses b = 0, it computes the diagram given in Figure 7 . The simulator can now answer any cheating verifier's challenge in the case b = 0. The simulator's response is indistinguishable from, and indeed identical to, that of the real prover.
If S guesses b = 1, it chooses some random isogeny φ C,AC : E C → E AC , and computes the diagram given in Figure 8 . The simulator uses this diagram to answer the cheating verifier's challenge in the case b = 1. In this diagram, the curves E C and E M C are genuine, and the curves E AC and E AM C are fake. However, the cheating verifier cannot tell that these curves are fake, or else one would be able to solve DSSP for the top face of the cube. Hence the simulator's response is indistinguishable from that of the real prover.
Remark 6.2. The indistinguishability portion of the above proof of the zeroknowledge property holds in the quantum setting as well as in the classical setting. Specifically, if we presume the existence of some quantum cheating verifier (CV) which can perform some quantum computation to distinguish the real transcript from the simulated transcript, then one could use this quantum cheating verifier to obtain a quantum algorithm for solving DSSP simply by alternately supplying the CV with either real curves E AC and E AM C (i.e. the real transcript), or with falsified curves E AC and E AM C (i.e. the simulated transcript), and seeing whether the CV's desired computation performs differently in the two cases.
Disavowal protocol
As before, we prove completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge.
Proof (Proof of completeness). Suppose first that E F is not equal to E AM . Using the algorithm presented in Section 4.2, the signer can always compute the diagram in Figure 3 and make the verifier accept. Assumption 5.10 guarantees that the verifier will always accept except with negligible probability. Note that the assumption is formulated without regard to whether the putative auxiliary points F P and F Q are compatible with E F or not. Now suppose that E F is equal to E AM . In this case, completeness can only fail if E F = E AM contains two distinct cyclic subgroups K 1 = m C P + n C Q and
But then E AM would be a branch point in the covering space of the modular curve X 0 ( e C C ) over the upper half plane, and the only such non-cusp branch points are the elliptic curves of j-invariant equal to 0 or 1728. The chance of E AM being equal to such a curve is negligibly small. Indeed, there are only two problematic j-invariants, and there are cryptographically many (e.g. 2 768 ) non-problematic j-invariants. A failure probability of 2 in 2 768 represents no cause for concern, since an adversary could simply guess the private key by brute force with higher success probability. Note that the j-invariant of E AM is determined by a combination of A's public key and the value of the hash h = H(M ) of the message M , and this value is never at any point under the control of an adversary. Likewise, the honest user has no control over E AM -its value is completely determined from the user's public key and the message.
Proof (Proof of soundness). Let Charles be a cheating prover that is able to convince the verifier with non-negligible probability that a valid signature is invalid. In order for Charles to be able to provide correct answers to both possible challenges in the confirmation protocol, there must exist a commutative diagram as in Figure 6 with all the edges filled in with actual isogenies. However, in this case, the forged isogeny φ F is computed using exactly the same inputs as the corresponding isogeny φ AM,AM C for the valid signature in the confirmation protocol, and hence necessarily has codomain E F equal to E AM C . Equality of E F and E AM C causes the disavowal protocol to fail. Hence soundness holds even against an infinitely powerful malicious prover.
Proof (Proof of zero-knowledge). To prove that this scheme is zero knowledge we construct a simulator. The simulator S makes uniformly random guesses about what the verifier's challenge will be. The simulator S first chooses random integers m C , n C ∈ Z/ e C C Z and computes
If S guesses b = 0, it computes the diagram given in Figure 9 . Here the curves E C , E M C , and E AC are genuine, and the curves E AM and E AM C are fake. The simulator uses the diagram to answer the cheating verifier's challenge in the case b = 0. The simulator's response is indistinguishable from the real prover, since otherwise one could solve DSSP for the bottom face of the cube.
If S guesses b = 1, it chooses some random isogeny φ C,AC : E C → E AC , and computes the diagram given in Figure 10 . The simulator uses this diagram to answer the cheating verifier's challenge in the case b = 1. In this diagram, the curves E C and E M C are genuine, and the curves E AC and E AM C are fake. However, the cheating verifier cannot tell that these curves are fake, or else one would be able to solve DSSP for the top face of the cube. Hence the simulator's response is indistinguishable from that of the real prover.
Remark 6.3. The indistinguishability portion of the above proof of the zeroknowledge property holds in the quantum setting as well as in the classical setting. Specifically, if we presume the existence of some quantum cheating verifier (CV) which can perform some quantum computation to distinguish the real transcript from the simulated transcript, then one could use this quantum cheating verifier to obtain a quantum algorithm for solving DSSP simply by alternately supplying the CV with either real curves E AC and E AM C (i.e. the real transcript), or with falsified curves E AC and E AM C (i.e. the simulated transcript), and seeing whether the CV's desired computation performs differently in the two cases.
Unforgeability and invisibility
Finally, we prove that the protocol satisfies the unforgeability and invisibility properties from Section 4.1.
Proof (Proof of unforgeability).
To prove unforgeability, we must show that after making a polynomial number of queries to a signing oracle, an adversary is still unable to generate a valid signature. Note that we have shown that the confirmation and disavowal protocols are zero-knowledge. Forging signatures is then equivalent to solving OMSSCDH.
Proof (Proof of invisibility).
To prove invisibility, we must show that after making a polynomial number of queries to a signing oracle, an adversary will still be unable to decide whether a given signature is valid. This problem is equivalent to OMSSDDH.
Quantum-resistant undeniable signatures
Under our simplifying assumption from Section 4.1, all parties except possibly the adversary are restricted to classical computation only. In this setting, all the security proofs in Section 6 other than those for the zero-knowledge proofs hold without modification, since none of these proofs ever at any point involves two quantum parties, and hence we do not need to consider quantum interactions.
By contrast, for zero-knowledge proofs, a classical security proof is not always automatically valid against quantum attacks, since there is the possibility of a nontrivial quantum interaction: a quantum cheating verifier could conceivably perform some quantum computation on an auxiliary input containing entangled state which is not accessible to the verifier or simulator [33] . Nevertheless, by Hallgren et al. [19] , any classical zero-knowledge proof secure against classical honest verifiers can be transformed into a classical zero knowledge proof secure against quantum cheating verifiers at the cost of doubling the number of messages, under the mild condition that the real message transcripts are quantum computationally indistinguishable from the simulated message transcripts. By Remarks 6.2 and 6.3, the real message transcripts are quantum computationally indistinguishable from the simulated message transcripts, for both the confirmation and disavowal protocols, under the assumption that the various computational problems of Section 5 are infeasible on a quantum computer. Therefore the Hallgren et al. transformation can be applied to our confirmation and disavowal protocols to obtain protocols which are zero-knowledge against quantum cheating verifiers. We remark that the prior work of Aguilar-Melchor et al. [1] does not specifically discuss the case of quantum adversaries, and may also require this transformation in order to achieve security against quantum adversaries.
Parameter sizes
As stated in [13, 20] , the fastest known quantum isogeny finding algorithms in our setting require O(n 1/3 ) running time, where n is the size of the kernel. Based on this figure, we obtain the following parameter sizes and signature sizes for various levels of security: Figure 4 .1] demonstrates that a single 1024-bit isogeny computation can be performed in 120 ms on a desktop PC, and in under 1 second on an Android device. Our protocol requires three such computations for signing, up to eight for confirmation, and up to nine for disavowal.
Conclusion
In this paper we present a quantum-resistant undeniable signature scheme based on the hardness of computing isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves. Our scheme represents the first quantum-resistant undeniable signature scheme based on a number-theoretic computational assumption, and compares well with the only prior undeniable quantum-resistant signature scheme (a code-based scheme) in terms of performance and bandwidth. Future work may entail developing new protocols such as digital signature schemes or more efficient schemes based on weaker assumptions.
